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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Petitioner/Appellee,
CaseNo.20050269-SC
v.

CaseNo.20030373-CA

TONYA ALTHOFF,
Respondent/Appellant
BRIEF OF PETITIONER
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to its power to grand certiorari.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (West 2004).
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Does a police officer give expert, as opposed to lay, opinion testimony when
expressing an opinion as to the amount of a controlled substance that typically constitutes
personal use?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "When reviewing cases under certiorari
jurisdiction, we apply a standard of correctness to the decision made by the court of
appeals rather than the trial court." Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, ^ 7, — P.3d
"However, the ultimate question of whether a particular set of facts satisfies a given legal
standard is a mixed question of law and fact." Id. Nonetheless, a trial court is granted

1

"wide discretion in his control over the examination of witnesses—lay and expert alike."
Perkins v. Fit-well artificial limb co., 514 p.2d 811,812 (Utah 1973).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following rules of evidence are central to the issues in this case:
Utah R.Evid 701:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness'
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to
those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on
the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness1 testimony or the determination of
a fact in issue.
Utah R. Evid 702:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training or education may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Summary of Proceedings
Tonya Althoff ("Althoff') and a companion, Thomas Kevin Rothlisberger, were
arrested following a traffic stop in Monticello, Utah, on September 23,2002. R. 141:54. On
September 26, 2002, she was charged by information with one count of possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine) with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii)(West 204); possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (West
2004); driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, a class B misdemeanor, in violation
2

of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.6 (West 2004); driving on suspended or revoked driver's
license, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227(l)(West
2004);and Failure to secure new registration and new certificate of title for her automobile, a
class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41 -1 a-703(West 2004). Following a
one-day jury trial, Althoff was convicted on all counts. Rothlisberger was convicted of
possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and possession of paraphernalia.
R. 90. On May 19,2003, Althoff received a one-to-15-year prison term, 12 months injail, a
fine of $925 and 36 months probation. R. 115-17. Rothlisberger received a suspended oneto-15-year prison term, 12 months injail, a fine of $925 and 36 months probation. R. 11517. However, his probation was later revoked and he was sent to prison. R. 157, 198-99.
Both defendants timely appealed. R. 118.
In a split decision, the court of appeals reversed Rothlisberger's conviction for
possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, but upheld his conviction for
possession of paraphernalia. State v. Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App 226, ^31 n.7, 95 P.3d
1193, Addendum A. Several months later, the court, relying on Rothlisberger, also reversed
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defendant's conviction, apparently on all counts. See State v. Althoff, 2005 UT App 69
(Memorandum Decision), Addendum B.1
The State timely petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari in both cases. On
November 24,2004, this Court granted the State's petition as to Rothlisberger. See Case No.
20040754-SC. On June 1, 2005, this Court granted the State's petition as to Althoff and
consolidated the matters for oral argument.
Statement of Facts
An eventful day
September 24, 2002, was an eventful day for Althoff and her companion, Thomas
Kevin Rothlisberger. While returning from Arizona, the two attracted the attention of
Monticello Police Officer Jim Eberling, who observed their car swerving and erratically
changing lanes. R. 141:50. When the vehicle stopped on the side of the road, Eberling
pulled up behind and asked the driver, Althoff, if anything was wrong. She explained that
she had been driving a long time and was tired. R. 141:51. Officer Eberling allowed her to
leave, but stopped her again almost immediately after learning that the plates on the car had
expired. Id. She was arrested when Officer Eberling discovered her driver's license had

Even if this Court declines to reverse the court of appeals on the central issue of both
cases—namely, whether a police officer provides "expert" testimony when he or she testifies
about the amounts of methamphetamine typically possessed for personal use vs.
distribution—it should still reverse in part because the^/zoj^decision sweeps too broadly in
apparently reversing defendant's convictions on all charges, including possession of drug
paraphernalia, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs and driving on suspended or
revoked driver's license, none of which are premised on the allegedly improper "expert"
testimony of Chief Adair.
4

been suspended. R. 141:52. Officer Eberling and Police Chief Kent Adair, who arrived to
assist in the arrest, searched the vehicle and discovered two baggies of methamphetamine,
scales and a device used for storing and ingesting methamphetamine called a "snort tube."
R. 141:53-56. The snort tube was covered with a white residue later identified as
methamphetamine. R. 141:62.
An amicable arrest
Following their arrest, Rothlisberger and Althoff were highly cooperative,
volunteering information about their purchase and use of methamphetamine. Rothlisberger
admitted he had used methamphetamine earlier in the day and that the snort tube discovered
in the search belonged to him.

R. 141:87-88.

Althoff acknowledged that the

methamphetamine had been purchased in Bluff, Utah, that she had used methamphetamine
earlier in the day and that she generally uses it twice a day. R. 141:69, 89. She also stated
that the gym bag containing the scales and baggies belonged to her. R. 141:69.
Despite their candor, they did not volunteer the location of the drugs, which officers
discovered on their own. The first baggy containing a small amount of methamphetamine
was quickly discovered in plain view between the driver and passenger seats. R. 141:53-54.
Eberling also found a gym bag in the back seat of the car that contained drug scales, which
was covered with a white residue, and several baggies. R. 141:59. Monticello Police Chief
Kent Adair, who arrived to assist in the arrest, discovered a second baggy of
methamphetamine after observing that Rothlisberger was very nervous while Officer
Eberling searched the front passenger seat. R. 141:83, 85.
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"I went over and told Jim—Officer Eberling—that whatever he was looking for was
in the front passenger seat," Chief Adair recalled. R. 141:85.
Chief Adair discovered the second baggy inside a toilet paper roll hidden underneath a
pair of men's pants that had been stuffed into the door panel on the passenger's side of the
car.

R. 141:84-85.

Analysis later determined the baggy contained 32 grams of

methamphetamine. R. 141:58, 100.
With the discovery of these additional items, both defendants resumed their candid
acknowledgment of culpability. Rothlisberger admitted the pants and the snort tube
discovered in the pocket were his. R. 141:97. He also told Chief Adair, "'I got that [the
device]—I've had that or I got that in my divorce,' or 'I've had that since my divorce.'" R.
141:87. Althoff claimed that all of the "crystal meth" was hers and that defendant knew
nothing about it. R. 141:61.
Trial
At trial, Officer Eberling and Chief Adair testified about the arrest and the
significance of the quantity of drugs found in the car. Defense counsel first elicited
testimony concerning the significance of the quantities of methamphetamine during crossexamination of Officer Eberling:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I believe, if I can go back, Exhibit No. 1
[small baggy] right here was what you found on the console, right?
[OFFICER EBERLING]: Yes.
Q.

That was with a small amount?

A.

Uh-huh.

6

Q.

Is that characteristic of what's sold?

A.

Yes.

Q.
It is. What—I mean you testified you believed it was for sale
(inaudible). Do you know how many (inaudible)?
A.

I don't—

Q.

Is that just one?

A.

I have no idea.

Q.
You have no idea on that. But that was what was found on the
console, right?
A.

Yes....

Q.

This wasn't the amount that made you think that they had it for
sale, right? It was this amount [large baggy]?

A.

Right.

Q.

And that was found in the side door?

A.

Right.

R. 141:64.
Chief Adair testified that he had been a police officer for 20 years. R. 141:82. During
that time, he had garnered extensive training and experience in drug intervention, including
40 hours of annual training for certification purposes. Id. He estimated that he had been
involved in at least 100 drug cases and he supervised members of the San Juan County Drug
Task Force.

Id. He also said he had learned through his experience how much

methamphetamine is generally possessed for personal use:
[PROSECUTOR]: Chief Adair, have you had an occasion in
your experience to look or see how methamphetamine is usually

packaged as far as - when you have found methamphetamine in
your experience (inaudible) have you found times when people
have had personal use amounts?
[CHIEF ADAIR]: Yes.
Q.

How is it usually packaged or what is the quantity?

A.
A quarter or half grams [sic], right in there. Maybe even
at the most a gram....
Q.
Do you have—through your training and experience, do
you know commonly what somebody would buy if they were to
go out on the street buy some right now, what would they
usually get for personal use? . . .
A.
In our undercover investigations when we buy from
individuals, we usually buy a quarter or a half a gram.
Q.
Have you ever found in your experience that someone
who had personal quantities of methamphetamine to have
scales?
A.

It's not common, no.

Q.
Do you know what those kind of items are used for other
than—have you seen these kinds of baggies where you have
found methamphetamine?
A.
Yes. . . . It's quite common with methamphetamine,
cocaine and those drugs in small quantities. You don't see that
with marijuana.
Q.

Have you ever - have you seen scales like this before?

A.

Yes.

Q.

In what context?

A.

Usually people that have quantities of drugs have scales.

R. 141:90-92.
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The two defense attorneys objected to this testimony, claiming it was "expert
testimony" under rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, and, as such, was improper because the
State had not given the defense 30 days advance notice, as required by statute.2 R. 141:10405. The trial court overruled the objection, holding that Chief Adair testified as a "lay
witness" under rule 701, Utah Rules of Evidence, which allows opinion testimony that
"would be rationally based on his perception, and would be helpful to a clear understanding
or determination of the facts and issues." R. 141:105.
Appeal
In reversing both convictions, the court of appeals held that Chief Adair's testimony
was improperly admitted as lay opinion testimony under rule 701, Utah Rules of Evidence.
Id. at \ 26. According to the court, his testimony was actually expert testimony, which
should not have been admitted because the State did not meet the requirements of the expert
witness notification statute, which requires 30 days advance notice. Id.; see Utah Code Ann.
§77-17-13 (West 2004).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Contrary to the holding of the court of appeals, the trial court correctly admitted Chief
Adair's testimony concerning the significance of different quantities of drugs, i.e., that those
who possess methamphetamine for personal use generally possess only a quarter- or halfgram. Chief Adair's testimony is lay opinion testimony, admissible under Rule 701, Utah

2

Defense counsel apparently made this objection during an unrecorded side-bar
conference, then later articulated the basis for the objection outside the presence of the jury.
R. 141:90,104-08.

9

Rules of Evidence, as interpreted by this Court. Moreover, this view accords with relevant
authority from other jurisdictions. The court of appeals erred principally in relying on
federal rules, commentary and caselaw to interpret Utah's rule 701, which has different
language from the federal rule 701 and has been interpreted differently by this Court.
Alternatively, Chief Adair's testimony should be regarded simply as statements of fact
admissible without appeal to rules governing opinion testimony. Finally, even assuming
arguendo that Chief Adair's opinion testimony was erroneously admitted, any error was
harmless because defendant's trial counsel introduced similar testimony on crossexamination of another witness.
ARGUMENT
I.

A POLICE OFFICER'S TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE
QUANTITY OF METHAMPHETAMINE GENERALLY
POSSESSED FOR PERSONAL USE IS NOT EXPERT
TESTIMONY.

In a 2-1 opinion, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in admitting
"expert" testimony by Chief Adair without requiring the State to meet the notice
requirements of Utah law. Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App 226 at f 32. The court reaches this
conclusion, not in reliance Utah's rule 701, but on what it describes as "the narrow
interpretative approach. . . . embodied by the 2000 amendment to rule 701 of the Federal

The State will refer to the Rothlisberger opinion throughout this brief because the
AlthoffpaneVs one-page memorandum decision simply incorporates Rothlisberger without
performing independent legal analysis.
10

Rules of Evidence..." Id. at \ 20. The 2000 amendments added a final clause to the federal
rule:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form
of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are
(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue,
and (c) not based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge
within the scope of Rule 702.
(Emphasis added to highlight amendment.) Relying largely on this amendment to the federal
rule and the accompanying advisory committee notes, the Rothlisberger majority held that
Chief Adair provided expert testimony when he stated that those who possess
methamphetamine for personal use generally possesses "[a] quarter or half grams [sic], right
in there.. . at the most a gram." See Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App 226 at ^ 26. The court
stated, further, that because it was expert testimony, the trial court improperly admitted it
under rule 701. Id. Under rule 701, Chief Adair was limited to "'the realm of common
experience' for the common juror," such as "his perceptions of the events" on the day of
defendant's arrest and "any opinions relating to any matters arising therefrom that would
have been within the common experience of a common citizen." Id. (citing Randolph v.
Collectramatic, Inc., 590 F.2d 844, 846 (10th Cir 1979)). This result is compelled by a need
to avoid "the open-ended approach . . . [that] would not only blur the distinction between
rules 701 and 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, but would also create the very real danger
that parties might impermissibly seek to avoid the reliability and reporting requirements
required under our law by merely engaging in semantics." Id.

11

To an extent, the court's concern is legitimate. A failure to adhere to reasoned
distinctions between lay and expert testimony could result in the abuses the court identifies.
However, this case does not implicate those concerns. Moreover, the Rothlisberger majority
does not provide the analysis needed to properly distinguish lay from expert testimony and to
prevent abuses. As a result, the court errs in concluding that allowing Chief Adair to testify
would blur the distinction between lay and expert testimony. In fact, this Court, along with
many others, has recognized that testimony such as Chief Adair's may be admitted as lay
opinion testimony under rule 701.
A.

When Properly Interpreted, Rule 701 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence Allows Lay Opinion Testimony From A Police Officer
Concerning the Quantity of Methamphetamine Generally
Possessed for Personal Use.

The Utah Rules of Evidence, like similar rules in virtually every state and federal
jurisdiction, recognize two kinds of opinion testimony—expert and lay. Rule 701, which
governs lay opinion testimony, states that:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in
the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences
which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful
to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the deterniination of a
fact in issue.
Rule 702, which applies to expert witnesses, states that:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
This Court has recognized that witnesses who testify about matters that may be
subject to expert treatment are not necessarily "experts." Clearly, a police officer may be
12

qualified as an expert before testifying about whether a certain quantity of a drug is
possessed for sale or for personal use. State v. Bankhead, 514 P.2d 800, 803 (Utah 1973)
(police officer's expert opinion testimony that amount and packaging of heroin indicated it
was possessed for sale supported guilty verdict).4 Nonetheless, a witness who testifies based
on personal observation and experience is not necessarily an expert. In State v. Ellis, 748
P.2d 188, 190-91 (Utah 1987), this Court reviewed defendant's claim that a security guard
who testified that footprints discovered outside a burglarized residence appeared to be the
same as those inside. Id. at 190. The defendant claimed that admission of this testimony
was improper because the guard did not have the expertise to offer an opinion on the
footprints. Id. This Court rejected that claim:
It is difficult to understand how [the guard's] lay testimony in
the form of an opinion became expert testimony. Simply
because a question might be capable of scientific determination,
helpful lay testimony touching on the issue and based on
personal observation does not become expert opinion. It is true
that if a question is capable of scientific determination, then
expert testimony is admissible with respect to i t . . . ; however,
that does not mean that lay opinion testimony is prohibited if the
provisions of the evidentiary rule are met.

4

Although factually very similar to Rothlisberger, Bankhead is distinguishable
because the Court did not address the question of whether the officer's expert testimony may
also have been admissible as lay opinion testimony. The defendant raised a sufficiency
claim and the Court merely noted that possession of certain quantities of heroin may support
the inference that the drug was possessed for distribution. Bankhead, 514 P.2d at 803. This
inference may be buttressed by "[experienced officers [who] may give their opinions in
cases involving possession of heroin that the narcotics are held for purposes of sale based
upon such matters as the quantity, packaging, and normal use of an individual..." Id.
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Id. at 191 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).5
Ellis provides the analytical framework for resolving the issues in this case. Both the
security guard and Chief Adair spokefrompersonal knowledge or "perception." See Utah R.
Evid. 701(a) (opinions or inferences must be "rationally based on the perception of the
witness"). The guard testified based on his first-hand observation—his "perception"—of
footprints in the mud outside a broken window and others inside the home leading away
from the window. Id. at 190. Chief Adair testified based on his first-hand knowledge of
defendant's arrest and the discovery of the large baggy of methamphetamine inside the
passenger door panel beneath a pair of defendant's pants. R. 141:84-85.
The security guard and Chief Adair both offered opinions that were rationally based
on their experiences. Chief Adair's testimony that the amount of methamphetamine
typically possessed for personal use is a quarter- to a half-gram was rationally based on his
experience as a narcotics officer who had participated in undercover operations involving
controlled buys from dealers. R. 141:91. The guard testified that a muddy footprint found
outside the house "with the distinctive heel marking appeared to be the one on the inside of

5

Utah is not alone in the view that certain evidence is subject to both lay and expert
treatment. See, e.g., United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 1008 (11th Circuit 2001)
(noting that it is erroneous to assume "that because an expert could provide the type of
testimony at issue, a lay witness cannot"); Gibson v. W. C.A.B., 861 A.2d 938,944 (Pa. 2004)
("This Court, from very early in Commonwealth history, interpreted the rules of evidence to
permit individuals not qualified as experts, but possessing experience or specialized
knowledge, to testify about technical matters that might have been thought to be within the
exclusive province of experts").
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the carpet." Ellis, 748 P.2d at 190. And while the rational basis for this opinion is not
explicitly stated, the Court notes that the guard is a former police officer, id, experience that
likely included evaluating crime scenes.
Thus, Ellis provides essential guidance in determining the proper scope of expert and
lay testimony under Utah law. Under Ellis9 lay opinion testimony, such as that provided by
Chief Adair, is admissible if the witness has first-hand knowledge of facts of the case and his
opinions and inferences are rationally based upon those facts.6
In attempting to distinguish Ellis, the Rothlisberger maj ority states that Ellis does not
resolve "the question of whether there are certain other subjects that should be considered so
intrinsically specialized that a witness could not testify regarding them without relying on the
types of 'scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge' that are characteristic of
expert testimony under rule 702." Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App 226 at ^j 13. Thus, instead of
plumbing the Ellis analysis for guidance in resolving the analogous issues in this case, the
Rothlisberger majority seems intent on limiting Ellis to its "express terms," i.e,. to opinion
testimony about muddy footprints. Id. at n.3. But Ellis need not be read so narrowly. Ellis
clearly supports the broader proposition that lay opinion testimony may be based on the
witness' personal experience without thereby becoming expert opinion testimony. The court
of appeals' unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of Ellis is largely responsible for the
erroneous interpretation of Utah's rule 701.

6

These points are further developed in section I.B., below.
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Instead of properly analyzing Ellis, the court of appeals looks to rule 701 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence and accompanying commentary along with federal caselaw. The
federal rule was amended in 2000 to add a final subsection emphasizing that opinion
testimony admissible under 701 should "not [be] based on scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702." Fed. R. Evid. 701(c). This federal
authority, however, is of limited assistance in analyzing rule 701 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, which has been construed by this Court to allow a wider range of lay opinion
testimony than what may be authorized by the amended federal rule. Also, the court of
appeals' reliance on interpretation of rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is dubious
given that Utah has not adopted the amendment. Because Utah's rule 701 has different
language, the amendment and commentary to the federal rule are especially inapposite.7
The Rothlisberger majority also errs in relying too heavily on federal appellate
rulings, some of which do not even address the admissibility of testimony under rule 701.
See, e.g., United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332 (10th Cir. 1994) and United States v.

The substantive effect of the 2000 amendments remains unclear. Although the
advisory committee notes to the 2000 amendment admonish that the amendment is intended
to "eliminate the risk that the reliability requirements set forth in Rule 702 will be evaded
through the simple expedient of proffering an expert in lay witness clothing," the amendment
does little if anything to clarify the proper scope of the rule. In fact, the advisory committee
notes state that the amendment "does not require witnesses to qualify as experts unless their
testimony is of the type traditionally considered within the purview of Rule 702." Advisory
Committee Notes to 2000 Amendments to Fed. R. Evid. 701 (emphasis added). Thus, the
amendment appears to be largely symbolic, intended as a reminder that the two rules
generally address different types of opinion testimony and that the traditional distinction
between the two should be maintained. See United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 1009,
n.9 (11th Circuit 2001) (opining that it is an "open question" whether 2000 amendments to
Fed. R. Evid 701 would entail results different from the unamended version).
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McDonald, 933 F.2d 1519, 1522 (1(T Cir.), cert denied, 502 U.S. 897 (1991). In
McDonald, for example, the 10th Circuit ruled that a police narcotics investigator could
testify as an expert that the 6.7 grams possessed by the defendant "was a lot larger than what
would normally be considered as a dose." 933 F.2d at 1521. But this holding is, at best,
tangential to the issues in Rothlisberger because the question of whether the testimony was
admissible under rule 701 was never raised or addressed. Rather, defense counsel objected
to the testimony, not because it was improperly admitted expert testimony, but because he
viewed it as so-called "profile" evidence that invaded the province of the jury. Id. In
Muldrow the court simply followed McDonald in upholding the admissibility of "expert"
testimony from a "veteran police officer" that a kilo of cocaine is more than what is needed
for personal use and indicates intent to distribute. Muldrow, 19 F.3d at 1338. Thus, neither
case has any clear relevance because they do not consider the question addressed by this
Court in Ellis and raised in Rothlisberger, i.e., whether the expert testimony, admissible
under rule 702, was also admissible lay opinion testimony under rule 701.
The one case cited by the Rothlisberger majority that directly addresses the interplay
between rules 701 and 702 in the context of a narcotics prosecution is United States v.
Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 523 U.S. 1131. However,
because Figueroa-Lopez offers little in the way of the reasoned analysis necessary to
properly distinguish between lay and expert opinion testimony, its significance is limited.
Figueroa-Lopez challenged the admission of lay opinion testimony from several DEA agents
that his actions "were consistent with those of an experienced narcotics trafficker." See, e.g.,
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id. at 1245. Agents testified that experienced narcotics traffickers generally exhibit the
following behaviors:
(1) countersurveillance driving;
(2) use of code words to refer to drug quantities and prices;
(3) use of a third-person lookout when attending a narcotics meeting;
(4) use of a rental car to make the drug delivery;
(5) hiding the cocaine in the door panels of a car; and
(6) dealing in large amounts of very pure cocaine.
Id at 1246.
In evaluating whether this testimony was improperly admitted expert testimony, the
Figuera-Lopez court turned to authority in the circuit, in particular United States v.
VonWillie, 59 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 1995), a case in which a police officer was allowed to
provide lay testimony concerning the nexus between firearms and drug dealers. In affirming
the trial court's decision to admit this testimony, the VonWillie court held that "[t]hese
observations are common enough and require such a limited amount of expertise, if any, that
they can, indeed, be deemed lay witness opinion." Id. Applying this yardstick, at least
ostensibly, the Figuera-Lopez court determined that the testimony that defendant was an
experienced drug trafficker was not "common enough" to be admitted as lay testimony under
rule 701. Figuera-Lopez, 125 F.3d at 1245.8 In an attempt to make the distinction clearer,
the court then observed that one agent offered proper lay opinion testimony when he
characterized as "suspicious" the defendant's driving patterns prior to making a drug sale.
Id. at 1246.

Nonetheless, the court affirmed the conviction after determining the error was
harmless. Figuera-Lopez, 125 F.3d at 1247.
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The Rothlisberger majority finds Figuera-Lopez "instructive." Rothlisberger, 2004
UT App 226 at Tf 21. In truth, however, Figuera-Lopez is so confused that it defies
consistent interpretation. Figuera-Lopez states only that testimony concerning the nexus
between guns and drugs and the characterization of a defendant's behavior as "suspicious"
are "common enough" to be admitted as lay opinion testimony under rule 701, while
testimony concerning other trappings of the drug trade is not. In reaching this conclusion,
the court provides no guidance in determining what kind of testimony is "common enough"
to be admitted under rule 701 or whether the commonality needed is that which is common
to a DEA agents or to the average citizen.9 Nor does it provide a clear explanation of what
behavior may properly be deemed by a lay witness as "suspicious" (other than driving in
circles, as Figueroa-Lopez did) or how lay testimony concerning a nexus between certain
kinds of weapons and drugs differs from "expert" testimony of other telltale signs of a drug
distribution operation.10 Because the Rothlisberger majority relies on imprecise and often
irrelevant federal caselaw, its conclusions are largely unsupported.
In short, the Rothlisberger majority errs in two principal ways. First, it ignores
relevant and helpful Utah precedent. Second, the court compounds this error by turning

9

As argued in section LB, below, proper lay opinion testimony would include that
rationally based on the witness' position as a DEA agent.
10

The court's failure to articulate the basis for its distinctions limits the opinion to its
facts. But even so limited, the opinion is internally inconsistent. For example, the court
states that it was proper lay opinion testimony for a police officer to opine that defendant's
behavior in driving around a parking lot several times before stopping to make a drug deal is
properly characterized by a layman as "suspicious," while the significance of
"countersurveillance driving" requires an expert. Figuera-Lopez, 125 F.3d at 1246.
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instead to the 2000 amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence and federal precedent,
which is either inapplicable or lacking in coherent analysis. What is necessary is analysis
offering a principled distinction between the kinds of testimony that fall under rule 701
versus 702. Below, the State will offer such analysis.
B.

Under Ellis, as well as Cases from Other Jurisdictions that Endorse
Lay Opinion Testimony Based on a Witness5 Position and Personal
Experience, Chief Adair's Testimony was Properly Admitted.

As shown in section A.3 above, the Rothlisberger majority errs because it fails to take
account of Utah precedent and turns instead to federal authority that is either distinguishable
or so confused as to offer little clear guidance. Under this Court's precedent, the fact that
certain testimony is susceptible to expert treatment does not necessarily mean that it must be
given expert treatment. Ellis, 748 P.2d at 189. Ellis suggests an approach very different from
the rigid and formalistic ruling from the Rothlisberger court.
Consistent with Ellis, many jurisdictions have taken a broader view of testimony
admissible under rule 701, especially in the law enforcement context. For example, police
officers are allowed to testify on the basis of field sobriety tests or other observations that a
ii
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defendant was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, even though such testimony is

11

E.g., Harris v. Dist. of Columbia, 601 A.2d 21, 25 (D.C. App. 1991); State v.
Lesac,, 437 N.W.2d 517, 519 (Neb. 1989); State v. Lindley, 210 S.E.2d 207, 210 (N.C.
1974).
12

Miller v. Commonwealth, 835 A.2d 866, 869 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003); State v.
Davies, 811 A.2d 600 (Pa. Sup. 2002); Harris v. Dist. of Columbia, 601 A.2d 21,25 (D.C.
App. 1991); State v. Locklear, 525 S.E.2d 813, 818 (N.C. App. 2000). Utah courts also
allow officers to testify about sobriety tests, apparently without requiring expert
qualifications. See, e.g., Salt Lake City v. Carrier, 664 P.2d 1168,1169 (Utah 1983) (based
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amenable to expert analysis. The Utah Court of Appeals has also held that a police officer
may offer non-expert testimony identifying the "distinctive aroma" of marijuana and the
mannerisms involved in smoking it. Provo City v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437,442-43 (Utah App.
1993); accord Chess v. State, 357 S.W.2d 386, 387-88 (Tex. Cr. App. 1962).
Courts have been especially receptive to the use of lay opinion testimony from
narcotics officers and agents, whose personal experiences provide insights into various
aspects of the drug trade. For example, most if not all courts allow lay testimony from
narcotics officers and other lay witnesses interpreting the "code words" used by drug
traffickers. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 291 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v.
Miranda, 248 F.3d 434, 441 (5th Cir. 2001), cert denied, 534 U.S. 980; United States v.
Coleman, 16 Fed. Appx. 744, 748 (9th Cir. 2001), cert denied, 534 U.S. 1147; State v.
Decay, 798 So.2d 1057,1074 (La. App. 2001), writ denied, 823 So. 2d 939; see also United
States v. Saulter, 60 F.3d 270,276 (7 Cir. 1995) (witness involved in drug trafficking with
defendants has same knowledge of code words as investigating agents and may therefore
offer interpretive testimony); United States v. Scott, 243 F.3d 1103, 1107 (8th Cir. 2001)
(same), cert, denied, 534 U.S. 931. Narcotics investigators have also been allowed to

on "observations of the driving pattern, field sobriety tests, the odor, and defendant's speech,
the officer formed the opinion that the defendant was intoxicated to the point that it impaired
his driving"); Salt Lake City v. Garcia, 912 P.2d 997,1000 (Utah App. 1996), cert, denied,
919 P.2d 1208 (sobriety test results admitted, not because they were scientific, but because
they were based on officer's "training and experience"). The State found only one case in
which a Utah court considered a challenge to the admission of sobriety test results based on a
claim that it was improperly admitted expert testimony. See State v. Strausberg, 895 P.2d
831, 833-34 (Utah App. 1995). However, the court declined to reach the issue because error,
if any, was harmless. Id. n.3.
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provide extensive testimony as laymen concerning the complex finances and operation of
drug distribution networks, United States v. Aw an, 966F.2d 1415,1430 (11 th Cir. 1992), as
well as other common practices in the drug trade. See, e.g., United States v. Flaherty, 295
F.3d 182,198 (2nd Cir. 2002), cert, denied, 537 U.S. 936 (co-conspirator properly allowed to
estimate weekly income of defendant in drug distribution operation); State v. Bunch, 408
S.E.2d 191, 194 (N.C. App. 1991) (agent properly testified that common practice in drug
transactions was to have different people carrying drugs and money so that, in event of
arrest, one person would not possess both); State v. Matthews, 720 So.2d 153,163 (La. App.
1998), writ denied, 740 So.2d 112 (opinion testimony from DEA agent concerning street
value of drugs proper because it was "within his personal knowledge and experience as a
narcotics officer"); see also United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131,1145-46 (7th Cir. 1982)
(co-conspirators in drug manufacturing may offer lay testimony identifying drugs)).
Many courts have also admitted non-expert testimony concerning drug quantities
generally possessed for personal use in contrast to amounts possessed for distribution—
testimony identical to that of Chief Adair. For example, in State v. Frasure, 100 P.3d 1013
(Mont. 2004), the defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute after police
discovered six baggies of methamphetamine in her purse. Id. at^f 7. The police officers who
arrested the defendant testified at trial that the amount of methamphetamine she was carrying
"illustrated she had an intent to sell." Id. at^[ 8. The defendant challenged her conviction based
in part on a claim that the officers improperly testified as experts. Id. at ^ 16. The court quickly
dispensed with this argument:
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In this case, the prosecution established that Officers Baumann and Brinkman
had extensive training and experience in the methods used in the illicit drug
trade and the prices that illicit drugs, such as methamphetamine, generally
garner. This provided a sufficient foundation for them to provide lay opinion
testimony as to whether it was likely that [defendant] possessed the drugs with
intent to sell. Their testimony was rationally based on their perceptions and
helped give a clear understanding of whether [defendant] had the necessary
intent.
Id. at f 16; accord Commonwealth v. Labitue, 731 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. App. 2000), review
denied, 137 N.E.2d 467 (permissible for arresting officers to testify that the weight and
packaging of cocaine defendant possessed was "more consistent with an intent to distribute
than with an intention to purchase a sizeable quantity for personal use"); Reece v. State, 878
S.W.2d 320, 325 (Tex. App. 1994) (police officer who had "made numerous narcotics
arrests" properly offered lay testimony that large amount of crack cocaine seized from
defendant, along with $200 in small bills, indicated defendant was selling drugs); State v.
Hall, 549 So.2d 373,389 (La. App. 1989), writ denied, 556 So.2d 1259 (undercover trooper
properly offered lay opinion testimony that he believed the defendant regarded him as a
potential drug buyer); see also United States v. Jones, 17 Fed. Appx. 240,2001 WL 1019398
(4th Cir. 2001), cert, denied, 534 U.S. 1117 (2002) (for sentencing purposes, trial court
properly relied on lay testimony from fellow inmate concerning the amounts of drugs
defendant sold at jail); United States v. Espino, 317 F.3d 788 (8 Cir. 2003) (lay witnesses,
all of whom had "substantial experience in the use and trade of illegal drugs," were properly
allowed to estimate the amounts of drugs purchased from defendant over the years).
In each of these cases, admissibility is a function of whether the witness' testimony is
"rationally based on [his or her] perception..." See Utah R. Evid. 701 (a). The "perception"
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component of the rule is satisfied when the witness was in a position to gather the facts that
form the basis of his or her opinion. Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153 (3d
Cir. 1993). In Lightening Lube, the court endorsed the admission of lay testimony
concerning damages from the owner of the plaintiffs business because he was involved in
the day-to-day operation of the business and, thus, was in a position to know. Id. at 1175. In
discussing the kinds of testimony traditionally admissible under rule 701, the advisory
committee notes to the 2000 amendments to the federal rule endorse the Lightening Lube
analysis: "Such opinion testimony is admitted not because of experience, training or
specialized knowledge within the realm of an expert, but because of the particularized
knowledge that the witness has by virtue of his or her position in the business. The
amendment does not purport to change this analysis." (Emphasis added.)
Thus, part of the foundation for a lay witness' testimony is that he or she participated
in the underlying events in a way that supports rational inferences. "The rational-basis
requirement 'is the familiar requirement of first-hand knowledge or observation.'" United
States v. Garcia, 291 F.3d 127,140 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting advisory committee notes on the
1972 proposed rule 701 of the federal rules) (additional citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 498, 511 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he witness
must have 'personal knowledge of the facts from which the . . . opinion is said to derive'")
(citation omitted). This requirement is differs from the foundational requirements for the
testimony of an expert, who generally becomes involved in the case long after the underlying
events and has no connection with case other than the relevance his or her expertise may
have to a fact in issue. See Utah R. Evid 702. Conversely, under rule 701, the lay witness is
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almost always a participant with first-hand knowledge. "When a witness has not identified
the objective bases for his opinion, the proffered opinion obviously fails completely to meet
the requirements of Rule 7 0 1 . . . because there is no way for the court to assess whether it is
rationally based on the witness's perceptions . .." Garcia, 291 F.3d at 140.
The first-hand knowledge requirement is critical to the admissibility of lay opinion
testimony. Indeed, many of the courts refusing to admit lay opinion testimony from law
enforcement personnel have done so not because they viewed it as disguised expert
testimony, but because the proponent failed to demonstrate that the witness' experiences
supported his or her opinions or inferences. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 212 F.3d
1305,1309-10 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert denied, 531 U.S. 1056 (police officer's testimony that
drug users often carry guns improper under rule 701 because it was not "rationally based on
his perceptions. He did not establish a factual basis for credible opinion testimony regarding
the likelihood of drug users being armed"); Davis v. State, 434 S.E.2d 132, 134 (Ga. App.
1993) (reversing conviction for possession with intent to distribute because police officer
who testified that defendant possessed more heroin than needed for personal use was not
qualified as an expert "and the State did not otherwise attempt to lay a foundation which
would demonstrate that the witness was qualified to testify . . . " ) .
The second foundational component under rule 701 is that the testimony must be
rationally based on the witness' knowledge of the underlying facts. As one court observed:
"[A] rational connection must exist between the opinion and the facts upon which it is based;
or put another way, the opinion... must be one that a normal person would form from those
perceptions." Soden, 714 F.2d at 511 (citation and internal punctuation omitted). Because
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testimony covered by this portion of the rule allows a witness to testify based on what could
be characterized as "specialized knowledge/' it resembles expert testimony, which may
account for the confusion over the proper reach of rule 701. The difference between the
specialized knowledge requirement of rule 702 and the personal experience requirement
under rule 701 has to do with the degree of specialization. "[Traditionally the subject of the
inference [in expert testimony] must be so distinctively related to a science, profession,
business, or occupation as to be beyond the ken of lay persons." Strong, John W.,
McCormick on Evidence, § 13 (5th ed. 1999 & 2003 Supp.). Or, as the Tennessee Supreme
Court stated, "The distinction between an expert and a non-expert witness is that a nonexpert witness' testimony results from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life and an
expert testimony results from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by
specialists in the field." State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 549 (Tenn.1992).
Under the foregoing analysis, Chief Adair's comments on the amounts of
methamphetamine typically possessed for personal use was not expert testimony, but rather
properly admitted lay opinion testimony. First, Chief Adair had the requisite first-hand
knowledge of the facts of the case. He assisted in the arrest and discovered the second baggy
of methamphetamine inside a toilet paper roll hidden beneath a pair of men's pants that had
been stuffed into the passenger-side door panel of the car. R. 141:84-85. Chief Adair also
interviewed defendant, who admitted the pants and the snort tube discovered in the pocket
were his. R. 141:97. In short, Chief Adair's involvement in the case unquestionably meets
the requirement of first-hand knowledge or observation. See Garcia, 291 F.3d at 140.
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Second, Chief Adair's testimony had a rational basis because he demonstrated the
requisite experience with drug investigations to interpret the facts. He testified that he had
been a police officer for 20 years and that he spent 40 hours annually training in drug
intervention. R. 141:82. He supervised members of the San Juan County Drug Task Force
and estimated he has been involved in at least 100 drug cases. Id. He also said his
experience included undercover investigations in which officers or others posing as buyers
would purchase a quarter- or half-gram of methamphetamine. Id. at 91. Thus, the following
testimony is clearly grounded in Chief Adair's personal experience as one of the arresting
officers whose knowledge of law enforcement allowed him to recognize that defendant and
his companion were drug dealers:
[PROSECUTOR]: Chief Adair, have you had an occasion in
your experience to look or see how methamphetamine is usually
packaged as far as - when you have found methamphetamine in
your experience (inaudible) have you found times when people
have had personal use amounts?
[CHIEF ADAIR]: Yes.
Q.

How is it usually packaged or what is the quantity?

A.
A quarter or half grams [sic], right in there. Maybe even
at the most a gram....
Q.
Do you have—through your training and experience, do
you know commonly what somebody would buy if they were to
go out on the street buy some right now, what would they
usually get for personal use? . . .
A.
In our undercover investigations when we buy from
individuals, we usually buy a quarter or a half a gram.
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Q.
Have you ever found in your experience that someone
who had personal quantities of methamphetamine to have
scales?
A.

It's not common, no.

Q.
Do you know what those kind of items are used for other
than—have you seen these kinds of baggies where you have
found methamphetamine?
A.
Yes. . . . It's quite common with methamphetamine,
cocaine and those drugs in small quantities. You don't see that
with marijuana.
Q.

Have you ever - have you seen scales like this before?

A.

Yes.

Q.

In what context?

A.

Usually people that have quantities of drugs have scales.

R. 141:90-92.
These opinions are "rationally based on the perception of the witness and... helpful
to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue."
Utah R. Evid. 701. 13 Chief Adair's rationally grounded opinion was that the defendant was
not merely a drug user, but rather a drug pusher.14 Although the average citizen may not

13

The requirement under 701(b) that the testimony be helpful is in essence a
relevancy requirement and was not challenged below and did not play a role in the court of
appeals' Rothlisbergex decision.
14

This perception has important implications, not only for the defendant, but also for
Chief Adair or any law enforcement officer who arrests someone involved in the sale of
narcotics, given that those involved in the drug trade often possess weapons and should be
regarded with greater caution. See United States v. VonWillie, 59 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir.
1995) (noting nexus between firearms and drug dealers).
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know how much methamphetamine is possessed for personal use, the process of reasoning
employed by Chief Adair is "familiar in everyday life." Brown, 836 S.W.2d at 549. Anyone
who was involved in narcotics purchases, either as an undercover police officer or a user,
would quickly learn how much is typically sold. Based on this experience, Chief Adair
knew that 32 grams of methamphetamine is many times the amount needed for personal use.
Such conclusions do not "result[] from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by
specialists in the field." See id. Accordingly, the Utah Court of Appeals erred in holding that
the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Chief Adair's testimony.
C.

Alternatively, Chief Adair's Testimony was Properly Admitted
Because It Consisted of Statements of Fact

Alternatively, Chief Adair's testimony was admissible because his statements were
not opinions at all, but statements of fact. Indeed, this is the conclusion reached by the trial
court when asked to reconsider the same issues in a post-trial motion for a certificate of
probable cause. R. 211-13. "The testimony] actually turned out to be neither expert
testimony or lay opinion testimony, but merely testimony about Adair's actual experiences."
R. 212. A number of courts have taken this view of testimony involving descriptions of the
drug trade drawn from a law enforcement officer's experience. For example, in Davenport
v. UnitedStates, 197F.2dl57,158(5*0^. 1952), certdenied, 344 U.S. 835, the court ruled
that an officer's testimony concerning an item of drug paraphernalia called a "finger stall"
"was neither immaterial nor a conclusion. The witness was not asked to give his opinion as
to the use made or intended to be made of the particular finger stall found. In connection
with his testimony as to finding it, he was asked, and testified, as to the nature and uses of
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finger stalls as he had observed them in his work as a narcotic officer. The answers made
were relevant and factual, and it was not error to admit them in evidence." Accord United
States v. DiMarzo, 80 F.3d 656 (1st Cir. 1996), cert denied, 519 U.S. 904 (1997) (law
enforcement agent's testimony concerning practices within drug trade not opinion
testimony); United States v. Kayne, 90 F.3d 7,12(lstCir. 1996), cert denied, 519U.S. 1055
("This testimony was not opinion testimony at all, but a simple recitation of an observed
phenomenon: the price paid for the coins").
In DiMarzo, the investigating agent, like Chief Adair, was one of the arresting officers
and testified about the "sting" operation resulting in the arrest of defendant and others.
DiMarzo, 80 F.3d at 658-59. The agent also testified concerning practices in the drug trade,
such as whether drug crime participants generally carry guns and whether innocent observers
are invited to drug transactions. Id. at 659. The defendant claimed on appeal that this was
improperly admitted expert testimony because the prosecutors had not provided proper
notice under the federal rules. Id. The court rejected this contention, holding that the agent's
testimony
expressed neither a lay nor an expert opinion, as distinguished
from a statement of fact as to what [the agent] had witnessed
during his 29 years in law enforcement. As the challenged
testimony proffered no opinion, lay or expert, but simply the
witness's personal experience relating to a subject bearing
directly upon the appropriateness of a jury inference,... we
reject the claim.
Id. at 659-60 (internal citations omitted; emphasis in original).
Chief Adair similarly drew on his 20 years of law enforcement experience in noting
that those who possess methamphetamine for personal use usually have less than a gram and
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generally do not have scales. Chief Adair never took the additional step of opining that
because of his experience, he believes defendant possessed the drugs with intent to
distribute. In short, Chief Adair offered no opinion on the significance of the quantities of
methamphetamine possessed by defendant. Thus, whether viewed as opinion or simply
statements of fact, Chief Adair's testimony was admissible.

II.

EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING CHIEF
ADAIR'S TESTIMONY, ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS.

Even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred in admitting Chief Adair's
opinion testimony, any error was harmless because Officer Eberling had already provided
similar testimony in response to defense counsel's questions.
"The complaining party cannot be prejudiced by the allegedly inadmissible
evidence if that party offers evidence to the same effect as the challenged evidence . . . or
if the challenged evidence is merely cumulative to other admitted evidence of like tenor."
Dunn v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railroad Co., 621 S.W.2d 245, 252 (Mo. App. 1981);
accord Allstate Ins. Co. v. McGee, 276 S.E.2d 108, 111 (Ga. App.1981) ("Since prior to
the complained of testimony other testimony of the same nature was admitted without
objection, any error in the admission of the subsequent testimony is deemed harmless");
Milford State Bank v. West Field Canal and Irr., 162P.2d 101, 103 (Utah 1945)
(improper testimony not prejudicial where similar testimony had been previously
admitted); see also State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1232 (Utah 1998) (defendant cannot
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complain of testimony solicited by State on cross-examination when defendant "opened
the door" by soliciting same testimony on direct).
The following exchange occurred during defendant's cross-examination of Officer
Eberling:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I believe, if I can go back, Exhibit No. 1 right
here was what you found on the console, right?
[OFFICER EBERLING]: Yes.
R.

That was with a small amount?

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

Is that characteristic of what's sold?

A.

Yes.

Q.
It is. What—I mean you testified you believed it was for sale
(inaudible). Do you know how many (inaudible)?
A.

I don't—

Q.

Is that just one?

A.

I have no idea.

Q.
You have no idea on that. But that was what was found on the
console, right?
A.

Yes....

Q.
This wasn't the amount that made you think that they had it for
sale, right? It was this amount?
A.

Right.

Q.

And that was found in the side door?

A.

Right.
32

R. 141:64-65.
Defendant clearly was the first to solicit testimony suggesting that he and Alfhoff
were not just users, but rather dealers. Although Officer Eberling's testimony was not as
detailed or direct as Chief Adair's, defense counsel still was the first to solicit testimony
concerning the amount of methamphetamine that is "characteristic of what's sold."
Accordingly, he cannot complain when the State offered testimony.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to issue a writ of
certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals directing entry of a judgment affirming the trial
court's rulings and Althoff s guilt.
Respectfully submitted rf^Say of July 2005.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General
BRETT J. EfeLPORTO
Assistant Utah Attorney General
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Thomas Kevin ROTHLISBERGER,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20030494-CA.
July 1,2004.
Background: Defendant was convicted in
the Seventh District Court,
Monticello
Department, Lvle R. Anderson, J., of
possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute and one count of
possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant
appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Jackson,
J., held that:
(1)
officer's
testimony
regarding
significance of amount of methamphetamine
found was expert testimony;
(2) defendant did not waive his right to
challenge admission of expert testimony by
failing to request continuance; and
(3) State failed to provide proper notice to
defendant of testimony of office who was
expert witness.
Reversed and remanded.
Bench, P.J., dissented.
West Headnotes
JjJ Criminal Law €^>629(11)
110k629Q 1) Most Cited Cases
Police officer's testimony that amount of
methamphetamine found was significant in
that it was likely that large amount was
intended for further sale was expert
testimony in possession with intent to
distribute prosecution, requiring State to

give defendant 30 days notice of testimony;
testimony was necessarily based on
scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge. Rules of Evid., Rule 702:
U.C.A.1953,77-17-13nXa).
121 Criminal Law €=^478(1)
110k478Q) Most Cited Cases
When a witness seeks to testify regarding
matters that are necessarily based on that
witness's
"scientific,
technical,
or
specialized knowledge," that witness must
be qualified as an expert under rule
governing testimony of experts, and all
reliability, reporting, or otherwise applicable
statutory commands must then be followed
with respect to that testimony. Rules of
Evid., Rule 702.
131 Criminal Law €=^478(1)
110k478(n Most Cited Cases
Witnesses can be qualified as experts not
only on the basis of formal educational
training, but also on the basis of their own
personal or vocational experiences. Rules of
Evid., Rule 702.
1£ Criminal Law €^>474.5
110k474.5 Most Cited Cases
i £ Criminal Law €^>478(1)
110k478m Most Cited Cases
Knowledge regarding the significance of a
particular quantity of drug is beyond the
realm of common experience for the
common juror, and is accordingly the type
of testimony that a witness could offer only
if first qualified as an expert. Rules of
Evid., Rule 702.
151 Criminal Law €^>1030(1)
110kl030(n Most Cited Cases
Parties are not required to make futile
objections in order to preserve a future
claim.
161 Criminal Law € ^ 1 0 3 6 . 6
110kl036.6 Most Cited Cases
Defendant did not waive his right to
challenge admission of expert testimony by
failing to request continuance, where trial
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court first erred by concluding that
challenged testimony was admissible as lay
witness testimony, making any objection
based on expert testimony rules futile.
Rules ofEvid., Rule 702.
HI Criminal Law €^629(11)
110k629a 1) Most Cited Cases
A party who is seeking to offer expert
testimony must first provide the other party
with a copy of the expert's name, address,
and
curriculum
vitae; this clearly
contemplates that the opposing party will
have the opportunity to prepare for that
expert's testimony in a witness-specific
fashion. U.C.A.1953,77-17-13(lYb\
181 Criminal Law €=>629(11)
110k629(l 1) Most Cited Cases
State failed to provide proper notice to
defendant of testimony of police officer who
was expert witness; although another officer
offered testimony that was similar in
content, officer did not testify as expert at
preliminary hearing, and State did not
provide defense with copy of officer's name,
address, and curriculum vitae. U.C.A.1953,
77-17-13(5)(aV
*1194 Barton J. Warren, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen., and Brett J.
Delporto, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City,
for Appellee.
Before BENCH. Associate P J., JACKSON
and ORME, JJ.
OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
**!***! Thomas Kevin Rothlisberger was
convicted of one count of Possession of a
Controlled Substance with Intent to
Distribute and one count of Possession of
Drug Paraphernalia.
Rothlisberger now

argues that the trial court erred in admitting
the testimony of Monticello Police Chief
Kent Adair (Chief Adair) as lay witness
testimony, and that the State therefore erred
by failing to provide thirty days notice of
that testimony as required by Utah Code
Annotated section 77-17-13 (2003). We
affirm in part and reverse in part.

BACKGROUND
***2 On September 24, 2002, Tonya
Althoff and Rothlisberger were pulled over
while returning to Utah after a brief trip to
Arizona.
Officer Jim Eberling (Officer
Eberling) initially pulled the pair over after
observing an improper lane change. At the
time of the stop, Althoff was driving the car
and Rothlisberger was sitting in the front
passenger seat. A subsequent search of
police records by Officer Eberling revealed
that the license plates on the car had expired
and that Althoff s driver license had been
suspended. Because of this, Althoff was
removed from the vehicle and placed under
arrest.
***3 After Althoff had been handcuffed
and placed in Officer Eberling's car, Officer
Eberling conducted a search of the vehicle.
During this search, Officer Eberling
discovered a small plastic bag containing
methamphetamine thai was located in plain
view on the console between the two front
seats. Sometime during this initial phase of
the *1195 search, Chief Adair arrived on the
scene. Due to the discovery of the small
plastic bag containing methamphetamine on
the front console, the officers placed
Rothlisberger under arrest and continued
with their search of the car. During this
search,
Chief
Adair
noticed
that
Rothlisberger had acted very nervous while
Officer Eberling was searching in the area of
the front passenger seat.
Based on
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Rothlisbergerfs behavior, Chief Adair
instructed Officer Eberling to focus on the
passenger side of the car. Further search led
to the discovery of a pair of men's pants that
had been stuffed into the passenger's side
door panel. Inside of the pants was a small
plastic bag, placed inside of a toilet paper
roll, that contained what was later shown to
be thirty-two grams of methamphetamine.
The officers also found a snort tube with the
pair of pants. The snort tube was covered
with a white residue that was later identified
as methamphetamine. During the further
search of the vehicle, the officers also found
a gym bag in the trunk that contained drug
scales, covered in white residue, and several
small plastic bags.
***4
After being given the Miranda
warnings, Rothlisberger admitted to officers
that the pants found stuffed in the passenger
side door were his. Rothlisberger also
admitted that the snort tube was his.
Rothlisberger further admitted to having
used methamphetamine before leaving
Arizona earlier that morning. After being
given the Miranda warnings, Althoff
claimed that the gym bag found in the trunk
was hers.
She also claimed that the
methamphetamine found in the car was hers,
and that Rothlisberger had no knowledge of
it.
** 2 ***5
o n September 26, 2002,
Rothlisberger was charged with one count of
Possession of a Controlled Substance with
Intent to Distribute, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated section 58-37-8(1 )(a)(iip
(2003), and one count of Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated section 58-37a-5(l) (2003).
[FN11 On December 2, 2002, Rothlisberger
appeared before the district court for his
preliminary hearing. At the preliminary
hearing, Officer Eberling testified regarding

the significance of the quantity of drugs
found in Rothlisberger's pair of pants.
Officer Eberling specifically testified that
the drugs found in the pants were of such
large quantity that it was likely that the
drugs were intended for further sale. Though
Chief Adair also testified at the preliminary
hearing regarding his participation in the
arrest, he did not offer any testimony at the
preliminary
hearing
regarding
the
significance
of
the
quantity
of
methamphetamine found in Rothlisberger's
pants.
FN1. Althoff was also charged with
various criminal counts arising out of
this same incident. Her subsequent
trial and convictions, however, are
not before us as part of this appeal.
***6 At trial, however, the prosecutor did
not ask Officer Eberling to offer his opinion
regarding the significance of the quantity of
methamphetamine found in Rothlisberger's
pants. Instead, questions regarding the
significance of the quantity were now
directed toward Chief Adair. The following
colloquies occurred during Chief Adair's
direct examination:
Q: Chief Adair, have you had an occasion
in your experience to look or see how
methamphetamine is usually packaged as
far
as—when
you
have
found
methamphetamine in your experience,
have you found times when people have
had personal use amounts?
A: Yes.
Q: How is it usually packaged or what is
the quantity?
A: A quarter or half grams, right in there.
Maybe even at the most a gram.
Q: Do you have-through your training
and experience, do you know commonly
what somebody would buy if they were to
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go out on the street buy some right now,
what would they usually get for personal
use?
A: I don't understand the question. What
do you mean what would they usually get?
Q: Well, if I A: Are you talking the quantity?
Q: Yes.
*1196 A: In our undercover investigations
when we buy from individuals, we usually
buy a quarter or a half a gram.
Q: Have you ever found in your
experience that someone who had personal
quantities of methamphetamine to have
scales?
A: It's not common, no.
***7 Defense attorneys objected to Chief
Adair's testimony, arguing that it should be
deemed expert testimony under rule 702 of
the Utah Rules of Evidence and accordingly
that admission of that expert testimony was
improper because the State had not given the
defense thirty-days notice of the expert
testimony as required by Utah Code
Annotated section 77-17-13 (2003). The
trial court overruled this objection, ruling
that Chief Adair's testimony was admissible
as lay witness testimony under rule 701 of
the Utah Rules of Evidence.
***8 On February 11, 2003, Rothlisberger
was found guilty on both counts. He now
appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
**3 ***9 Rothlisberger argues that the trial
court erred in admitting Chief Adair's
testimony regarding the significance of the
quantity of methamphetamine found in
Rothlisberger's pants. We review decisions
relating to the qualification of a witness as
an expert or as a lay witness for an abuse of

discretion. See Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d
917, 925 (Utah Ct.App.1989). TFN21
FN2. Rothlisberger also argues that
the State's pretrial failure to notify
him of Chief Adair's potential
testimony violated rule 16 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Because we hold that reversal is
warranted due to the State's failure to
comply with Utah Code Annotated
section 77-17-13 (2003), we need not
reach the merits of this separate
claim.
ANALYSIS
£1] ***10 Under Utah Code Annotated
section 77-17-13(l)(a) (2003), "[i]f the
prosecution or the defense intends to call
any expert to testify in a felony case at trial
...the party intending to call the expert shall
give notice to the opposing party as soon as
practicable but not less than 30 days before
trial."
Rothlisberger argues that Chief
Adair's testimony regarding the significance
of the amount of methamphetamine found
with his pants was expert testimony, and that
the State's failure to give him thirty-days
notice of that testimony warrants reversal.
We agree.
***11 Under the Utah Rules of Evidence,
lay witness testimony is defined as
testimony that is "rationally based on the
perception of the witness," Utah R. Evid.
701, while expert testimony is testimony
that is based on "scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge." Utah R.
Evid. 702. There have been multiple Utah
cases that have discussed the question of
whether a witness maty be classified as an
expert for the purposes of testifying about a
particular subject. See, e.g., Smith v. Grand
Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57,f 25,
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84 P.3d 1154; Alder v. Bayer Corp., 2002
UT U5.K % 52-86, 61 P.3d 1068. The
question before us today, however, is not
whether the State could have offered expert
testimony regarding this subject, but rather
whether that subject is so specialized that
the State must first qualify its witness as an
expert before the trial court can properly
admit testimonial opinion regarding it.

for expert testimony. Left unresolved in
Ellis, however, was the question of whether
there are certain other subjects that should
be considered so intrinsically specialized
that a witness could not testify regarding
them without relying on the types of
"scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge" that are characteristic of expert
testimony under rule 702. [FN3]

***12 The State contends that this subject
was resolved by the opinion of our supreme
court in State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188 (Utah
1987). In Ellis, one of the issues before the
court was whether a lay witness could be
allowed to offer his opinion that two
separate footprints that were found at the
scene of a crime came from the same shoe.
See id, at 190. In ruling that such testimony
was admissible as lay witness testimony, our
supreme court held that
[s] imply because a question might be
capable of scientific determination, helpful
lay testimony touching on the issue and
based on personal observation does not
become expert opinion. It is true that "if
[a question] is capable of scientific
determination, then expert testimony is
admissible with respect to it"; however,
that does not mean that lay opinion
testimony is prohibited if the provisions of
the evidentiary rule are met.
*1197 Id. at 191 (citation omitted)
(alterations in original).

FN3. It is worth noting that under
Ellis's express terms the State would
not have been prevented from calling
an expert witness in footprint
identification to further bolster its
case before the jury, nor would the
State have been prevented from
attempting to bolster that very
witness's
own
credibility
by
attempting to qualify him as an
expert in footprint identification or
forensic investigation.
**4 ***i4 T 0 date, there has been no Utah
decision that has directly addressed the
question of whether a witness must be
characterized as an expert in order to testify
about a particular subject. In circumstances
in which Utah courts have not definitively
addressed an issue, it is appropriate for us to
turn to decisions and commentators that
interpret the related federal rules for
guidance. See State v. Gomez, 2002 UT
120.1 33 n. 5,63P.3d72.

***13 Contrary to the State's assertions, we
do not think that Ellis is directly controlling
here.
In affirming the trial court's
conclusion that the challenged testimony
was lay testimony, the Ellis court simply
concluded that though the subject of
footprint comparison might be a subject
about which experts could testify, the
challenged testimony itself did not
automatically meet the definitional standards

***15 Our review of the related federal
cases indicates that the question of whether
a person must be designated as an expert to
testify regarding a particular subject is one
that has been the subject of much
disagreement among the federal courts.
Some courts have taken a narrow
interpretive approach to this question,
holding that a witness whose testimony
could be admitted as expert testimony under
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rule 702 must be admitted as an expert in
order to testify regarding that subject. In
Randolph v. Collectramatic, Inc., 590 F.2d
844 (10th Cir. 1979\ for example, the Tenth
Circuit held that a lay witness is not
permitted to "express an opinion as to
matters which are beyond the realm of
common experience and which require the
special skill and knowledge of an expert
witness." Id. at 846. This bright line rule
was similarly emphasized by the Fourth
Circuit in Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's,
London v. Sinkovick 232 F.3d 200 (4th
Cir.2000), wherein the court held that rule
701 does not permit lay witnesses to testify
about matters that are necessarily predicated
on "some specialized knowledge or skill or
education that is not in the possession of the
jurors." Id. at 203 (quotations and citation
omitted). In this manner, courts that have
adopted this narrow interpretive approach
have essentially concluded that the
definitional boundary separating rule 701
lay testimony from rule 702 expert
testimony should be carefully observed. In
essence, courts following this approach hold
that while lay witnesses are allowed to
testify regarding their direct perceptions of
the events in question, opinions or
inferences that are reliant on "scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge"
are necessarily excluded unless the witness
is first qualified as an expert.
***16 Other federal courts have favored a
more liberal interpretive approach to the
question at hand. The Fifth Circuit, for
example, has clearly held that lay witness
testimony may include opinions that are
predicated on "specialized knowledge," as
long as that testimony is rationally based on
the "personal perception" of the witness.
United States v. Riddle, 103 F.3d 423, 428
(5th Cir. 1997V
Thus, in Soden v.
Freizhtliner Cory., 714 F.2d 498 (5th

Cir. 1983), the court held that a mechanic
was allowed to testify as a lay witness
regarding his conclusion that a particular
design defect was not only dangerous, but
also the likely cause of a series of accidents.
See id. at 510-12. In holding that the
testimony was admissible as lay witness
testimony, the court emphasized that the
mechanic's testimony was based on his own
personal observations of the involved trucks,
see id. at 511-12, and that the opinions that
he offered were "rationally" related *1198 to
those personal observations. Id. at 512. The
court thus emphasized that though the
witness's testimony "did constitute an
opinion which might have better been given
by one more formally an expert," its "strong
basis both in his observation and in his
experience" rendered it a subject about
which lay testimony could appropriately be
offered. Id.
**5 ***i7 Various other federal courts
have followed this more liberal interpretive
approach. For example, the Eighth Circuit
held that "four executives of railroads" were
allowed to testify "that, in their experience,
trains with cabooses were no safer than
cabooseless trains." Burlington N. R.R. Co.
v. Nebraska, 802 F.2d 994. 1004 (8th
Cir. 1986). According to the Burlington N.
R.R. Co. court, this testimony was
appropriately characterized as lay witness
testimony because it was based on the
executives' own "personal experiences." Id.
Similar results were reached in such cases as
United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131,
1145 (7th Cir.l982\ and United States v.
VonWillie. 59 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir.1995).
***18
The more liberal interpretive
approach has, however, been the subject of
some criticism. One respected commentator
has written that "many courts expanded the
admissibility of lay opinion and inference
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testimony beyond Rule 70 Ts primary
purpose, thereby permitting lay opinion
testimony to encroach on Rule 702's
province." 4 Joseph M. McLaughlin et al.,
Weinstein's
Federal
Evidence
§
701.03[4][b] (2d ed.2004).
This same
commentator further wrote that "[i]n some
instances, it has been difficult to discern
from the court's opinions why the admissible
lay opinion testimony' was not, in fact,
'expert opinion testimony.' " Id. Certain
federal courts have been similarly critical of
the liberal approach. The Eleventh Circuit,
for example, has recently noted that the
liberal approach would potentially allow
parties to evade the strictures of the expert
qualification
process
by
simply
characterizing their expert witnesses as lay
witnesses. See Tampa Bay Shipbuilding &
Repair Co. v. Cedar Shipping Co., 320 F.3d
1213,1222 filth Cir.2003).
***19 Th e s e concerns appear to have been
shared by the drafters of the federal rules.
Indeed, the 2000 amendment to rule 701 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence appears to
have been expressly drafted for the purpose
of closing this erstwhile loophole. Before
the amendment, rules 701 and 702 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence were silent on the
issue of whether lay witnesses were allowed
to offer opinions on certain subjects that
would
normally
require
specialized
knowledge. The 2000 amendment to rule
701 changed this, however, with the rule
now expressly declaring that lay witnesses
are not allowed to offer testimony that is
"based on scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge within the scope of
Rule 702." Explaining the purpose of this
amendment, the advisory committee notes to
rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
expressly state that "[r]ule 701 has been
amended to eliminate the risk that the
reliability requirements set forth in Rule 702

will be evaded through the simple expedient
of proffering an expert in lay witness
clothing." The advisory committee notes
further state that
[tjhe amendment does not distinguish
between expert and lay witnesses, but
rather between expert and lay testimony.
Certainly it is possible for the same
witness to provide both lay and expert
testimony in a single case.
The
amendment makes clear that any part of a
witnesses] testimony that is based upon
scientific technical, or other specialized
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702 is
governed by the standards of Rule 702 and
the corresponding disclosure requirements
of the Civil and Criminal Rules.
**6/d. (emphasis added).
[21 ***20 After considering the different
approaches to this question, we are
persuaded that the narrow interpretive
approach embodied by the 2000 amendment
to rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
is the correct approach to follow in
interpreting our own rules of evidence.
When confronted with questions of rulebased or statutory interpretation, we
endeavor to interpret the rules and statutes in
such a manner so as to give full meaning
and effect to all of the involved provisions.
Here, adopting the open-ended approach
discussed above would not only blur the
distinction between rules 701 and *1199 702
of the Utah Rules of Evidence, but would
also create the very real danger that parties
might impermissibly seek to avoid the
reliability and reporting requirements
required under our law by merely engaging
in games of semantics. To avoid opening
the door for such results, we think it clear
that when a witness seeks to testify
regarding matters that are necessarily based
on that witness's "scientific, technical, or
specialized knowledge," that witness must
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be qualified as an expert under rule 702 of
the Utah Rules of Evidence, and all
reliability, reporting, or otherwise applicable
statutory commands must then be followed
with respect to that testimony. [FN4]
FN4. In State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d
350 (Utah 1996), our supreme court
noted that "when a new rule ...
constitutes a clear break with the
past, it is not generally applied
retroactively." Id at 354. This is
particularly so where a retroactive
application would impair our efforts
to "maintain[ ] the efficient
administration of justice." Id.
We recognize here that our
interpretation of rules 701 and 702 of
the Utah Rules of Evidence settles a
question for which there had been
little prior guidance from Utah
appellate courts.
We further
recognize that this issue is likely the
subject of some dispute in many
cases that are currently before our
various courts. In order to maintain
the efficient administration of
justice, we accordingly hold that
today's opinion should only be
applied prospectively, and that any
decisions relating to this question
that were entered prior to today's
holding should not be reversed
thereby.
***21 The Ninth Circuit's opinion in
United States v. Fizueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d
1241 (9th Cir.l997\ is instructive. In
Figueroa-Lopez, the defendant was charged
with various counts relating to an illegal
drug transaction. See id. at 1242. At trial,
various federal agents who were involved in
the surveillance of the defendant testified
regarding the events leading up to the arrest.
See id. One agent, testifying as a lay

witness, asserted that the defendant had
engaged in "countersurveillance" activities
that were "common practice for narcotics
dealers" and that the defendant's use of a
rental car was also "a common practice for
narcotics dealers." Id. at 1243. On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit overruled the trial court's
conclusions that the testimony was properly
admissible as lay witness testimony. See id.
at 1246. In so ruling, the appellate court
found that the testimony was necessarily
predicated on "demonstrable expertise" in
the area of law enforcement, id, and that the
subjects about which the agent testified were
therefore not "common enough" to be the
subject of lay witness testimony. Id. at 1245.
Responding to the government's argument
that the testimony was admissible as lay
witness testimony due to its reliance on the
agent's own personal observations, the court
noted that the government's argument would
"simply blur[ ] the distinction between
Federal Rules of Evidence 701 and 702.... A
holding to the contrary would simply
encourage the Government to offer all kinds
of specialized opinions without pausing first
properly to establish the
required
qualifications of their witnesses." Id. at
1246.
**7 ***22 Importantly, the FigueroaLopez court then identified portions of
another agent's testimony that were properly
admissible as lay witness testimony. Noting
that one of the agents had testified regarding
the "suspicious" nature of the defendant's
conduct, the court expressly held that
opinions regarding whether a person is
acting suspiciously are "common enough" to
be admissible as lay witness testimony. Id.
at 1246. The decision in Figueroa-Lopez
therefore provides an example of how the
rules do "not distinguish between expert and
lay witnesses, but rather between expert and
lay testimony." Fed R. Evid. 701 advisory
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committee notes. Thus, it is "[c]ertainly ...
possible for the same witness to provide
both lay and expert testimony in a single
case." Id
***23 The question before us in the
present case, then, is whether Chief Adair's
testimony regarding the significance of the
quantity of methamphetamine found in
Rothlisberger's pants was the type of
testimony that was necessarily based on
scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge. We hold that it was.
[31 ***24 It is well settled that witnesses
can be qualified as experts not only on the
basis of formal educational training, but also
on the basis of their own personal or
vocational experiences. See, e.g., State v.
Kellev. 2000 UT 4 1 ^ 15, 1 P.3d 546;
niOORandle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1337
(Utah 1993). In State v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d
420 (Utah 1986\ for example, our supreme
court held that a witness's prior experience
as a "user and seller" of drugs qualified him
to testify as an expert on "the current drug
culture." Id at 420. Similarly, in Randle,
our supreme court held that a witness could
be qualified as an expert in accident
reconstruction by virtue of his practical
experience dealing with such matters. See
Randle, 862 P.2dat 1337.
***25 There have been no Utah cases that
have specifically addressed the question of
whether knowledge of the significance of a
particular quantity of an illegal drug should
be regarded as specialized knowledge about
which a witness must be qualified as an
expert in order to testify. The Tenth Circuit,
however, has specifically addressed this
question and has definitively concluded that
such knowledge should be regarded as
specialized knowledge. In United States v.
McDonald 933 F.2d 1519 (10th Cir.l99R

the court noted that the "[defendant
possessed 6.7 grams of rock cocaine." Id at
1522. The court then concluded that "[a]
person possessing no knowledge of the drug
world would find the importance of this fact
impossible to understand. The average juror
would not know whether this quantity is a
mere trace, or sufficient to pollute 1000
people." Id. In United States v. Muldrow, 19
F.3d 1332 (10th Cir.l994\ the court
similarly held that "a veteran police officer"
testified from "specialized knowledge" when
he testified that a particular amount of
cocaine would likely be "for distribution and
not for personal use." Id at 1338.
**8 141 ***26 We agree with the Tenth
Circuit's assessment of this question. In our
view, knowledge regarding the significance
of a particular quantity of drug is "beyond
the realm of common experience" for the
common juror, Randolph 590 F.2d at 846,
and is accordingly the type of testimony that
a witness could offer only if first qualified as
an expert. [FN5] Applied to the present case,
Chief Adair was clearly permitted to offer
lay witness testimony regarding the events
leading up to Rothlisberger's arrest. Chief
Adair was further permitted to offer
testimony that was rationally derived from
his perceptions of the events on that day.
Such testimony could also have included
any opinions relating to any matters arising
therefrom that would have been within the
common experience of a common citizen.
The State was not permitted, however, to
elicit any opinions or conclusions from
Chief Adair that were necessarily based on
scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge, without first seeking to qualify
him as an expert witness under *1201 rule
702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The
testimony from Chief Adair based on his
specialized knowledge was
therefore
permissible only upon compliance with all
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applicable laws and rules relating to expert
testimony. Because the trial court allowed
Chief Adair to testify as a lay witness
regarding these matters, we thus necessarily
conclude that the court abused its discretion.
1TN61
FN5. The State argues that, under
the terms of our decision in Provo
City Corp. v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437
(Utah Ct.App.1993), we should
reach a different result on this
question. In Spotts, we held that a
lay witness was permitted to testify
regarding the identity of a particular
drug. See id at 442-43. In reaching
that conclusion, we ,femphasize[d]
that [the] case involved not only the
substance's
smell,
but
also
simultaneous observation of the
smoke exiting defendant's mouth and
prior observation of the act of taking
'hits' from a 'joint' " Id at 443. In
our view, the result in Spotts was
necessarily predicated on our
recognition of the degree to which
certain drugs have permeated our
society.
Because
of
this
proliferation, knowledge of the
appearance, smell, and resultant
physical effects of certain substances
can unfortunately be considered
common knowledge in our society.
Our decision in Spotts implicitly
acknowledged this sad state of
affairs, and thus appropriately held
that opinions regarding the identity
of particular substances can be the
subject of lay testimony.
The
question before us here, however,
does not deal with the common
juror's ability to merely identify a
particular substance, but instead
deals with the common juror's ability
to identify whether a particular

quantity of an illegal substance is so
large that it would likely be used for
future sale. By definition, the only
persons having such knowledge
would be those who are either
actually involved in the sale of
illegal substances, or those who are
involved in lav/ enforcement's efforts
to curb such sales. Either way, this
knowledge must be regarded as
specialized, and testimony that is
based on that knowledge would
therefore
appropriately
be
characterized as expert testimony.
Notably, a similar result was
emphasized by the federal rules
advisory committee. As noted in the
advisory committee notes to Federal
Rule of Evidence 701, testimony
that a substance appeared to be a
narcotic .... is not based on
specialized knowledge within the
scope of Rule 702, but rather is
based upon a layperson's personal
knowledge. If, however, that witness
were to describe how a narcotic was
manufactured, or to describe the
intricate workings of a narcotic
distribution network, then the
witness would have to qualify as an
expert under Rule 702. Fed.R.Evid.
701 advisory committee's note.
FN6. After the conclusion of the
trial, the trial court was asked to
reconsider its prior ruling regarding
the nature of Chief Adair's
testimony. In this post-trial ruling,
the court held that Chief Adair's
testimony "actually turned out to be
neither expert testimony or lay
opinion testimony, but merely
testimony about Adair's actual
experiences." In support of that
conclusion, the court noted that
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Chief Adair had not actually offered
a direct opinion as to whether the
quantity of methamphetamine that
was found in Rothlisberger's pants
was a saleable quantity, but that
Chief Adair had instead simply
testified in general terms regarding
the significance of such quantities in
his past experiences. The State thus
argues that we should alternatively
affirm the rulings below on the basis
of this post-trial ruling. We disagree.
The trial court may have been
technically correct in noting that
Chief Adair did not offer a direct
opinion as to whether Rothlisberger
had the intent to distribute illegal
drugs. As noted by the trial court, it
does appear that the questions
relating to the significance of various
quantities of illegal drugs were
framed with reference to Chief
Adair's past experiences, and that
Chief Adair was never directly asked
how
the
quantity
of
methamphetamine that was found in
Rothlisberger's
possession
comported
with
those
prior
experiences. The State's failure to
elicit such direct, case-specific
opinion testimony does not mean,
however,
that
Chief
Adair's
testimony should not still be
regarded as expert testimony. Rule
702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
specifically states that an expert who
testified "by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education
may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise" (Emphasis
added.) Under its express terms, the
rule therefore contemplates that nonopinion testimony can still be
qualified as expert testimony if it is
based on specialized knowledge or

experience. One example of nonopinion expert testimony is then
specifically referred to in rule 703 of
the Utah Rules of Evidence, which
states that expert testimony may be
admitted in the form of "an opinion
or inference." We think it plain that,
in the present circumstances, Chief
Adair's testimony was certainly
intended to create the inference that
the
thirty-two
grams
of
methamphetamine
found
in
Rothlisberger's pants were of such a
large quantity that an intent to
distribute could be inferred.
Cf.
State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 320
(Utah 1985) (noting that the quantity
of an illegal substance can be used as
evidence of an intent to distribute);
State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258,
1262 (Utah 1983) (same). As such,
the trial court erred in its conclusion
that Chief Adair's failure to offer a
direct opinion as to the meaning of
this particular evidence rendered his
testimony admissible as non-expert
testimony.
***27 Having concluded that the trial
court abused its discretion in characterizing
Chief Adair's testimony as lay witness
testimony, we can readily conclude that the
State was required to comply with the notice
requirements for expert witnesses contained
in Utah Code Annotated section 77-17-13
(2003V Under section 77-17-13(l¥a), the
State was required to provide Rothlisberger
with thirty-days notice that it intended to
offer Chief Adair as an expert witness;
section 77-17-13(lYb) specifically requires
that notice to include
the name and address of [Chief Adair],
[Chief Adair]'s curriculum vitae, and one
of the following:
(i) a copy of [Chief Adairj's report, if one
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exists; or
(ii) a written explanation of [Chief Adair]'s
proposed testimony sufficient to give the
opposing party adequate notice to prepare
to meet the testimony; and
(iii) a notice that the expert is available to
cooperatively consult with the opposing
party on reasonable notice.
***28 The State argues that, even if we
conclude that Chief Adair's testimony
constituted expert testimony, compliance
with section 77-17-13 was still not required
for two reasons. First, the State argues that
Rothlisberger's failure to request a
continuance acted as a waiver of his right to
notice.
Second, the State argues that
Rothlisberger was given notice of the
proposed testimony by virtue of the similar
testimony that was offered by Officer
Eberling at the preliminary hearing. We
disagree.
[51 [61 ***29 It is generally true that, when
a party is confronted with surprise expert
testimony at trial, a failure to request a
continuance acts as a waiver of the right to
challenge the admission of that testimony.
See State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211,f 37,
52 P.3d 451 ("When the prosecution
introduces
unexpected
testimony,
a
defendant 'essentially *1202 waives his right
to later claim error' if the defendant fails to
request a continuance or seek other
appropriate relief under Rule 16(g) [of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure]."
(Quoting State v. Rugebrezt. 965 P.2d 518,
522 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (quoting State v.
Larson 775 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1989)).)).
In contrast to the waiver cases cited by the
State, however, the situation before us is not
one in which the defendant failed to request
a continuance upon being presented with
surprise expert testimony. Rather, this is a
situation in which, after receiving the

appropriate objection from the defendant,
the trial court expressly determined that the
challenged testimony was not expert
testimony, but that it was instead admissible
as lay witness testimony. As discussed
above, we have determined that that ruling
was in error. As a result of the trial court's
ruling, however, the mandatory continuance
provisions of section 77-17-13f4)fa) would
have necessarily been deemed inapplicable,
insofar as there was no court-recognized
expert testimony being offered. In essence,
the trial court's ruling that the testimony was
lay witness testimony rendered any
objection that was predicated on experttestimony rules futile. Under our law,
parties are not required to make futile
objections in order to preserve a future
claim. See Orem City v. Bovo, 2003 UT
ADD 286,111 13, 16, 76 P.3d 1170. Thus,
because the trial court first erred by
concluding that the challenged testimony
was admissible as lay witness testimony, we
cannot say that Rothlisberger waived his
right to challenge the admission of that
testimony by then failing to request a
continuance under section 77-17-13(4)fa).
** 9 jTj *** 30 N e x t j section 77-17-13(5)(a)
provides that "testimony of an expert at a
preliminary hearing .... constitutes notice of
the expert, the expert's qualifications, and a
report of the expert's proposed trial
testimony as to the subject matter testified to
by the expert at the preliminary hearing."
We disagree with the State's suggestion,
however, that the testimony of Officer
Eberling at the preliminary hearing provided
Rothlisberger with notice of the similar
testimony that was ultimately offered by
Chief Adair at trial. Under the terms of
section 77-17-13(1)0:)), a party who is
seeking to offer expert testimony must first
provide the other party with a copy of the
expert's name, address, and curriculum
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vitae. This clearly contemplates that the
opposing party will have the opportunity to
prepare for that expert's testimony in a
witness-specific fashion. See Turner v.
Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021. 1023 (Utah 1994)
(holding that one of the "significant
purposes" of pretrial witness disclosure rules
is to provide the opposing party with the
opportunity to "investigat[e] the witnesses]
testimony" and "prepar[e] an effective crossexamination"). In State v. Tolano, 2001 UT
App 37,19P.3d400, we held that the notice
provision of section 77-17-13(5)(a) is only
satisfied where a witness personally testifies
at the preliminary hearing; otherwise, the
opposing party would not have the time to
"prepare to meet [the] adverse expert
testimony." Id. at ^f 18 (quotations and
citation omitted).
£81 ***31
Here, Officer Eberlingfs
testimony at the preliminary hearing did not
provide Rothlisberger with the proper
opportunity to prepare for Chief Adair's
expert testimony. Though the testimonies of
the two officers might ultimately have been
similar in content, it is nevertheless clear
that the State's failure to provide notice of
Chief Adair's potential expert testimony at
trial deprived Rothlisberger of the notice
that he would need to prepare a witnessspecific response to that testimony. Thus,
because Chief Adair failed to testify as an
expert at the preliminary hearing, the State's
failure to provide Rothlisberger with notice
of his testimony constituted a violation of
section 77-17-13(5)(a). Inasmuch as that
testimony was central to the Possession with
Intent to Distribute charge, we accordingly
reverse Rothlisberger's conviction. [FN7]
FN7. Rothlisberger also argues (i)
that the trial court erred in denying
his motion for a directed verdict; (ii)
that the trial court erred in overruling

his objection to various statements
made by the prosecutor in his closing
statement; and (iii) that the trial
court erred by failing to instruct the
jury on the alternate reasonable
hypotheses of innocence. Because
we have already determined that a
new trial is warranted with respect to
Rothlisberger's
conviction
for
Possession of a Controlled Substance
with Intent to Distribute, we need not
address these arguments with respect
to that charge.
With respect to Rothlisberger's
arguments relating to his conviction
for
Possession
of
Drug
Paraphernalia, we conclude that
reversal is not warranted. As noted
above, Rothlisberger admitted to the
officers that the snort tube that was
found in the car was his.
Rothlisberger has not contested the
admissibility of that admission
before this court, nor has he argued
that the snort tube does not constitute
drug paraphernalia under Utah Code
Annotated section 58-37a-3 (2002).
As such, we can readily conclude
that the court did not err in denying
his motion for a directed verdict on
that charge.
We can further
conclude that any error that the court
might have made with respect to the
rulings
regarding
either
the
prosecutor's closing statements or the
alternate reasonable hypothesis of
innocence doctrine was harmless.
Accordingly,
Rothlisberger's
conviction for Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia is affirmed.
*1203 CONCLUSION
***32 We conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion when it allowed Chief
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Adair to testify as a lay witness about the
significance of various quantities of
methamphetamine. Because the State failed
to give Rothlisberger thirty-days notice of
that testimony as required by Utah Code
Annotated section 77-17-13 (2003\ we
reverse Rothlisberger's conviction for
Possession with Intent to Distribute and
remand for a new trial on that charge.
***33 I CONCUR:
ORME, Judge.

GREGORY K.

***34 I DISSENT: RUSSELL W.
BENCH, Associate Presiding Judge.
95 P.3d 1193, 2004 WL 1469314 (Utah
App.), 503 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 2004 UT
App 226
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Before Judges DAVIS, JACKSON, and
THORNE.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For
Official Publication)
THORNE, Judge:
*1 Toyna Althoff appeals her conviction for
possession of a controlled substance with the
intent to distribute, as well as her associated
convictions for possession of drug
paraphernalia and various traffic related
crimes. We reverse.
Althoffs arrest, conviction, and appeal
mirror those of her companion at the time of
her arrest, Thomas Kevin Rothlisberger. See
State v. Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App 226, 95
P.3d 1193, cert granted, 2004 Utah LEXIS
248 (Utah Nov. 24, 2004). Moreover, she
presents an issue that is identical to the issue

central to our decision in Rothlisberger,
namely, whether the trial court erred in
refusing to recognize that a portion of Chief
Adair's testimony was expert testimony and,
if so, whether Althoffs right to notice of the
nature of Adair's testimony and his
background was violated. See id. at \ \ 1027. Having decided in Rothlisberger, under
identical circumstances, that the trial court's
decision was improper, and that the State
failed to comply with the requirements of
Utah Code section 77-17-13 (2003), we are
compelled to follow that decision here. See
State v. Simms, 881 P.2d 840, 843 n.7 (Utah
1994) ("Stare decisis requires that a decision
rendered by a court in a particular factual
context govern later decisions by that court
arising under the same or similar facts.").
Accordingly,
we . reverse
Althoffs
convictions and remand this case for a new
trial. [FN1]
FN1. The Utah Supreme Court has
granted the State's petition for
certiorari in State v. Rothlisberger.
See 2004 UT App 226, 95 P.3d 1193,
cert, granted, 2004 Utah LEXIS 248
(Utah Nov. 24, 2004). Assuming that
the State's dissatisfaction with the
outcome of the instant case mirrors
its position in Rothlisberer, we
encourage
it
to
move
for
consolidation of the two cases.
WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge,
and NORMAN H. JACKSON, Judge.
2005 WL 375089 (Utah App.), 2005 UT
App 69
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